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Choosing and remembering secure passwords poses a problem to
users. The password card is a proposal intended to help users to cope
with this problem. It is a paper card with a grid of random letters,
numbers, and symbols, on which users choose a starting point and
a walk of adjacent cells. The characters on the traversed cells form
the new password. We analyze the security and memorability of
passwords created this way. We find that users mostly choose pre-
dictable walks and starting points. At the same time, memorability
of the passwords seems low. Thus, the password card seems to fail
in helping users to choose and remember secure passwords.
1 INTRODUCTION
While text passwords are the most widely used authentication
scheme, choosing and remembering hard to guess text passwords is
a challenge for users [8]. Proposals trying to help users to cope with
this problem include electronic means (i.e. password managers [6])
and analog means (i.e. means to securely take notes of passwords
such as securely stored password logbooks [4]). While there exists
a vast amount of literature examining the security (e.g. [5]) and the
usability (e.g. [3]) of password managers, the security and usability
of analog means are an uncharted area.
The goal of this work is to evaluate the security andmemorability
claims of one specific analog means: the password card. It is a paper
card (roughly the size of a credit card), with a grid of random letters,
numbers, and symbols. To create a password, users choose a starting
point and then a walk of adjacent cells (see fig. 1).
We evaluated the security and memorability of this solution in a
user study with 30 participants. Our results indicate that the most
popular walks chosen by the participants are straight horizontal
lines and that the starting points are not randomly dispersed on the
grid. At the same time, memorability of the passwords seems low.
2 THE PASSWORD CARD
The password card was proposed to help users choosing and re-
membering secure text passwords [7]. It consists of a grid filled with
letters, numbers, and symbols (see fig. 2). The grid’s coordinates are
the letters A-Z for the x-axis and the numbers 1-12 for the y-axis.
As the letters, numbers, and symbols in the grid are the same for
all users, losing the password card does not pose an availability
problem and the card does not need to be kept secret.
To create a password with the password card, the user chooses
a starting point and then creates a walk of adjacent cells in the
grid with a length of at least 8. The characters traversed in that
walk form the new password (see fig. 1 for an example). Usage
instructions are printed on the card below the grid and on its back.
3 METHODOLOGY
To evaluate the security and memorability of passwords created
with the password card, we conducted a user study. The studymeets
all requirements of our university’s ethics commission. Participants
were recruited on the street and by word of mouth. Overall 30
participants were recruited for the study. Each participant received
5e as compensation. The study’s procedure comprised five phases
and took overall about 20 minutes for each participant:
Phase 1: The participants received a brief introduction to the
password card. Then, they were given a password card to familiarize
themselves with it (including reading the information on its back).
Phase 2: After familiarization with the password card, the par-
ticipants received a first questionnaire. In this questionnaire the
participants were asked if they had already known the password
card before the study, and if so, whether they also use it.
Phase 3: Having answered the first questionnaire, the partici-
pants were asked to create passwords for the three purposes “pri-
mary e-mail”, “online banking”, and “online forum” by using the
password card. Each password was created using a separate paper
password card one after the other. The participants were instructed
to create the passwords according to the instructions on the card,
i.e. choosing a starting point and creating a walk containing at least
eight characters. The participants marked the starting point with a
circle and the walk with a line through the respective grid cells (as
shown in fig. 1). Then, the cards were collected.
Phase 4: As distraction after creating the passwords, the par-
ticipants answered a second questionnaire, including questions
regarding demographic data (e.g. age, gender) and further ques-
tions regarding the use of the password card (e.g. whether they
would use it in the future). Answering it took about 5-10 minutes.
Phase 5: Lastly, participants were asked whether they remem-
bered the three passwords they created before. To verify whether
the participants’ perception of the extend to which they remem-
bered the passwords is correct, the participants had to mark their
passwords on three empty password cards analogously to phase 3.
Then, the participants were asked about their choice of passwords
(i.e. starting points and walks). Finally, they were informed about
the purpose of the study and received their compensation.
Figure 1: An example for a walk in the password card corre-
sponding to the password “Wb4Fs7ES6”.
Figure 2: Heatmap of all the starting points chosen by the
participants in our study.
4 RESULTS
The sample was relatively even distributed with respect to gender
(13 male, 17 female participants). The age of the participants ranged
from 19 to 70 years with a mean of 34.2 years.
4.1 Security
The security of the passwords created with the password card
depends on whether (a) the starting points are randomly dispersed
on the grid and (b) the walks are not predictable.
To investigate the dispersion of starting points, we use the spatial
J (r ) statistic as proposed for security analysis in [2], where r is the
radius around each point considered for the dispersion. J (r )-values
close to 1 represent a random distribution of the starting points (as
would be desirable for password security). J (r )-values below 1 indi-
cate clustering. J (r )-values above 1 indicate spatial regularity. With
J (2) = 0.785, the starting points seem to be somewhat clustered.
The heatmap in Figure 2 illustrates the dispersion. The answers
regarding the participants reasons for choosing the starting points
shed further light on this result. The coordinates of the starting
points were often chosen taking semantics from the account: “For
the starting point for the bank password I chose ‘B’ and ‘9’ because it’s
for the bank and my account number starts with a ‘9’” (p3), “For the
banking password I chose a random cell with a dollar sign in it and
for the email a cell with an ‘@’ sign” (p6). Other participants used
personal information or personal experience to choose the starting
points: “To choose the coordinates I chose the first letter of my name
and a number from my date of birth” (p18), “I chose as coordinate for
the email password my lucky number” (p13). However, others stated
to have chosen completely random starting points.
Regarding the walks used by the participants for their passwords,
the vast majority is made up only of vertical or horizontal move-
ments (83.3%). Walks with diagonal movements are the exception
(16.7%). Also, the majority of walks (41.1%) do not change direction,
i.e. are straight lines (23.3% horizontal, 10.0% vertical, 7.8% diago-
nal). Most of the horizontal and diagonal lines run from left to right.
22.2% of walks change direction only once (for details see fig. 3).
Again the answers regarding the participants reasons for choosing
their walks shed further light on this result. They center around
considerations with respect to memorability: “The characters in the
grid are already random, therefore the walk does not need to be. So I
chose a straight line because it’s easier to remember.” (p27), “I chose a
straight line because I can remember it more easily.” (p4).
Figure 3: The frequencies with respect to the number of
changes in direction in thewalks chosen by the participants.
Figure 4: The frequencies with respect to what extend the
participants remembered their passwords.
4.2 Memorability
The majority of passwords could not be reproduced by the par-
ticipants in phase 5: only 43.3% of the passwords were fully re-
membered by the participants (see fig. 4 for details). Thereby, the
participants perceived only for 58.9% of the passwords correctly,
what they remembered about them (with respect to the categories
from fig. 4). However, in contrast to the participants’ assumptions
that straight lines would be easier to remember, this does not seem
to be the case. A Fisher’s exact test failed to find a significant differ-
ence in whether the participant could remember their passwords
between straight lines and other walks (FET: p = 0.829).
5 CONCLUSION
Our analysis of the security and memorability of the password card
shows that memorability seems low, even after only 5-10 minutes.
Also, we identify similar issues as security analyses of other ap-
proaches [1, 2]: (a) the starting points are not randomly dispersed
in the grid and (b) most walks chosen in our study are straight lines
or have just one directional change. Thus, the password card seems
to fail in helping users to choose and remember secure passwords.
The next step in this work is to validate our results with a larger
participant sample in an online study. Also, based on a larger sample
of starting points and walks, a specialized guessing algorithm could
be developed and evaluated.
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